50 U.S.C. § 2301 : US Code - Section 2301: Findings

Search 50 U.S.C. § 2301 : US Code - Section 2301: Findings

Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Weapons of mass destruction and related materials and
technologies are increasingly available from worldwide sources.
Technical information relating to such weapons is readily
available on the Internet, and raw materials for chemical,
biological, and radiological weapons are widely available for
legitimate commercial purposes.
(2) The former Soviet Union produced and maintained a vast
array of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons of mass
destruction.
(3) Many of the states of the former Soviet Union retain the
facilities, materials, and technologies capable of producing
additional quantities of weapons of mass destruction.
(4) The disintegration of the former Soviet Union was
accompanied by disruptions of command and control systems,
deficiencies in accountability for weapons, weapons-related
materials and technologies, economic hardships, and significant
gaps in border control among the states of the former Soviet
Union. The problems of organized crime and corruption in the
states of the former Soviet Union increase the potential for
proliferation of nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical
weapons and related materials.
(5) The conditions described in paragraph (4) have
substantially increased the ability of potentially hostile
nations, terrorist groups, and individuals to acquire weapons of
mass destruction and related materials and technologies from
within the states of the former Soviet Union and from unemployed
scientists who worked on those programs.
(6) As a result of such conditions, the capability of
potentially hostile nations and terrorist groups to acquire
nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons is
greater than at any time in history.
(7) The President has identified North Korea, Iraq, Iran, and
Libya as hostile states which already possess some weapons of
mass destruction and are developing others.
(8) The acquisition or the development and use of weapons of
mass destruction is well within the capability of many extremist
and terrorist movements, acting independently or as proxies for
foreign states.
(9) Foreign states can transfer weapons to or otherwise aid
extremist and terrorist movements indirectly and with plausible
deniability.
(10) Terrorist groups have already conducted chemical attacks
against civilian targets in the United States and Japan, and a
radiological attack in Russia.
(11) The potential for the national security of the United
States to be threatened by nuclear, radiological, chemical, or
biological terrorism must be taken seriously.
(12) There is a significant and growing threat of attack by
weapons of mass destruction on targets that are not military
targets in the usual sense of the term.
(13) Concomitantly, the threat posed to the citizens of the
United States by nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical
weapons delivered by unconventional means is significant and
growing.
(14) Mass terror may result from terrorist incidents involving
nuclear, radiological, biological, or chemical materials.
(15) Facilities required for production of radiological,
biological, and chemical weapons are much smaller and harder to
detect than nuclear weapons facilities, and biological and
chemical weapons can be deployed by alternative delivery means
other than long-range ballistic missiles.
(16) Covert or unconventional means of delivery of nuclear,
radiological, biological, and chemical weapons include cargo
ships, passenger aircraft, commercial and private vehicles and
vessels, and commercial cargo shipments routed through multiple
destinations.
(17) Traditional arms control efforts assume large state
efforts with detectable manufacturing programs and weapons
production programs, but are ineffective in monitoring and
controlling smaller, though potentially more dangerous,
unconventional proliferation efforts.
(18) Conventional counterproliferation efforts would do little
to detect or prevent the rapid development of a capability to
suddenly manufacture several hundred chemical or biological
weapons with nothing but commercial supplies and equipment.
(19) The United States lacks adequate planning and
countermeasures to address the threat of nuclear, radiological,
biological, and chemical terrorism.
(20) The Department of Energy has established a Nuclear
Emergency Response Team which is available in case of nuclear or
radiological emergencies, but no comparable units exist to deal
with emergencies involving biological or chemical weapons or
related materials.
(21) State and local emergency response personnel are not
adequately prepared or trained for incidents involving nuclear,
radiological, biological, or chemical materials.
(22) Exercises of the Federal, State, and local response to
nuclear, radiological, biological, or chemical terrorism have
revealed serious deficiencies in preparedness and severe problems
of coordination.
(23) The development of, and allocation of responsibilities
for, effective countermeasures to nuclear, radiological,
biological, or chemical terrorism in the United States requires
well-coordinated participation of many Federal agencies, and
careful planning by the Federal Government and State and local
governments.
(24) Training and exercises can significantly improve the
preparedness of State and local emergency response personnel for
emergencies involving nuclear, radiological, biological, or
chemical weapons or related materials.
(25) Sharing of the expertise and capabilities of the
Department of Defense, which traditionally has provided
assistance to Federal, State, and local officials in
neutralizing, dismantling, and disposing of explosive ordnance,
as well as radiological, biological, and chemical materials, can
be a vital contribution to the development and deployment of
countermeasures against nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons
of mass destruction.
(26) The United States lacks effective policy coordination
regarding the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction.